Torts-Participant in Athletic Competition States Cause of Action for Injuries against Other Participant by Barklage, Daniel K.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 2 Spring 1977 Article 12 
Spring 1977 
Torts-Participant in Athletic Competition States Cause of Action 
for Injuries against Other Participant 
Daniel K. Barklage 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel K. Barklage, Torts-Participant in Athletic Competition States Cause of Action for Injuries against 
Other Participant, 42 MO. L. REV. (1977) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 








Plaintiff and defendant were participants in a soccer match. Plaintiff,
the goal keeper, received a pass and gained possession of the ball in the
"cpenalty area."2 Defendant, an opposing forward, continued to run toward
plaintiff and kicked his head causing plaintiff severe injuries. Plaintiff
commenced this action for negligence and produced expert witnesses who
testified that soccer rules prohibit opposing players from making contact
with the goal tender while he has possession of the ball in the penalty area.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant. On appeal the
court reversed and remanded, holding that when athletes are engaged in
athletic competition, the teams are trained and coached by competent
personnel, a recognized set of rules governs the play, and a safety rule is
contained therein which is primarily designed to protect players from
injury, a player is liable for a deliberate, wilful, or reckless violation of said
rule which causes injuries. The court explicitly denied defendant's conten-
tion that he was immune from tort liability for an injury to another player
happening during the course of a game.
A participant in an athletic event can base an action to recover for
injuries caused by another player upon three theories. The first theory is
assault and battery. The defendant is liable for battery if he acts intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact upon a person and such contact
results from his act.3 The defendant is liable for assault if, with the same
intent, the plaintiff is put in imminent apprehension of a battery.4 These
elements can usually be established when a fight occurs during a sporting
event and thus it would appear that plaintiff-athletes would often be
successful. 5 However, defendants have usually escaped liability for assault
and battery by establishing the defense of consent.6
1. 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
2. The penalty area is a rectangular area between the eighteenth yard line
and the goal.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
4. Id. at § 21. In general the intent required in assault and battery is met if
the defendant desires the results or believes that the results are substantially certain
to follow. Id. at § 8A.
5. Comment, Violence in Professional Sports, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 771, 775
(1975).
6. The courts have also precluded recovery for assault and battery by finding
either insufficient evidence of intent or that the contact was not "offensive contact."
In Thomas v. Barlow, 5 N.J. Misc. 764, 138 A. 208 (1927) the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant intentionally struck him with a fist during a basketball game, fractur-
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Courts have drawn a distinction in assault and battery cases between
consent to acts which are lawful and those which are criminal. The majority
view holds that consent to a criminal act does not prevent recovery in civil
assault and battery.7 The minority view holds that consent to a criminal act
is a defense to civil assault and battery,8 presumably because of the public
policy of denying a wrongdoer redress for his participation in illegal
events. Thus, under the minority view if A and B consent to a boxing
match which is criminal under state law neither is liable in tort to the other.9
The cases dealing with lawful games hold that consent precludes recovery
for assault and battery. In McAdams v. Windham10 deceased and defendant
were engaged in a legal boxing match. An unknown heart defect of the
deceased caused his death after a blow to the chest by defendant. The court
denied recovery, holding that deceased consented. In Gibeline v. Smith"
two adults were playfully scuffling and plaintiff was injured. Although not
explicitly mentioning consent, the Missouri court denied recovery for as-
sault and battery, finding that the parties' acts were voluntary, mutual, and
lawful.' 2
Consent to an assault and battery may be actual or apparent. 3 In
Heliriegel v. Tholl 4 plaintiff was attending a picnic with friends. After
plaintiff playfully taunted, "you couldn't throw me in the lake if you tried,"
defendants grabbed him and in the ensuing scuffle one of the defendants
accidentally slipped and fell onto plaintiff's head, breaking his neck. The
court held that plaintiff's words, in this playful setting, could reasonably be
understood as inviting defendants to try to throw him into the lake and
thus constituted apparent consent.15 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that by taking part in a game or contest one apparently consents to such
bodily contacts as are permitted by the rules and customs of the game.' 6 As
ing his jaw. The court held that a directed verdict should be set aside as the
evidence showed only an accidental blow. See also Hellriegel v. Tholl, 69 Wash. 2d
97, 417 P.2d 362 (1966) (contact not "offensive contact"); Bourque v. Duplechin,
331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976) (contact not intentional).
7. Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 123, 68 N.W. 869 (1896).
8. Goldnamer v. O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S.W. 831 (Ky. App. 1896).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C, Comment b, illus. 1 (Tent.
Draft No. 18, 1972). The Restatement follows the minority approach. See generally
Note, 26 MIcH. L. REV. 322 (1927).
10. 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922).
11. 106 Mo. App. 545, 80 S.W. 961 (K.C. Mo. App. 1904).
12. In Nicholls v. Colwell, 113 Ill. App. 219 (1903) defendant while involved in
roughhouse play squeezed a young girl causing her injuries. The court stated that if
the contact by defendant was invited, provoked, or willingly encouraged by plaintiff
the sporting conduct would be lawful and the defense of consent would be available
to the defendant.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
14. 69 Wash. 2d 97, 417 P.2d 362 (1966).
15. This reasoning is consistent with the approach taken by the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972) which defines apparent
consent as words or conduct which are reasonably understood by another as
intended as consent.
16. § 50, Comment b (1965).
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in Hellriegel, the setting, consisting of the rules and customs of the game,
determines if plaintiff's participation in the game can reasonably be inter-
preted as consent to bodily contacts. Thus, participating in a game does not
manifest consent to acts which are prohibited by the rules and customs of
the game, especially if such rules are designed to protect players from
harm. 17 A football player, by the fact of his participation, apparently
consents to the normal intentional contact incident to the game but does
not consent to an intentional "clip" which is a violation of a rule designed
primarily to protect players from serious harm.
In Hellriegel plaintiff also contended that defendants' conduct ex-
ceeded the scope of his consent because he merely consented to being
thrown in the lake and not to having his neck broken. Following the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,18 the court held that for consent to be effective
it need only be to the intentional act, such as rough and tumble horseplay,
and not to the injuries which may accidentally result. The risk of accidental
injuries is on the person who engages in the athletic event. Thus, if athletic
participants do not engage in intentional conduct which is markedly differ-
ent from that to which plaintiff consented or apparently consented, 19 they
will not be liable in assault and battery for resulting accidental injuries. 20
The second theory of recovery available to a participant injured in an
athletic event is negligence. Early cases seemed to allow recovery only for
intentional acts21 and recovery for negligence seemed "almost out of the
question. 1 2 In more recent cases a cause of action for negligence has been
stated for injuries incurred in golf, 23 fishing,24 baseball, 25 snow skiing, 26
17. Id.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972)
provides in part:
(2) To be effective, consent must be
(a) By one who has the capacity to consent, or by a person empowered
to consent for him, and
(b) To the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A, Comment e (Tent. Draft No.
18, 1972) provides in part:
The consent must be to the actor's conduct, or to substantally the same
conduct, rather than to the invasion which results from it. Consent to an
invasion by particular conduct is not consent to the same invasion by
entirely different conduct. Thus one who consents that another may walk
across his land does not, without more, consent that the other shall drive
an automobile across it. ...
20. In McAdams v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922) deceased and
defendant were engaged in a mutual boxing match in a spirit of play. An unknown
heart defect of deceased caused his death after a blow to the chest by the defendant.
The court used the defense of consent to deny recovery. The deceased consented to
the particular act of defendant's punches and his consent was effective although
there was no consent to the unanticipated death.
21. Thomas v. Barlow, 5 N.J. Misc. 764, 138 A. 208 (1927) (intentional blow to
the jaw in a basketball game).
22. Note, 26 MICH. L. REV. 322 (1927).
23. Thomas v. Shaw, 217 Ga. 688, 124 S.E.2d 396 (1962).
24. Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 1956).
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and ice skating.27
Contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are defenses to
negligence. Contributory negligence requires conduct by the plaintiff
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection. 28 Assumption of the risk takes two forms in sporting
events. When the plaintiff voluntarily enters into a game knowing and
appreciating the risks involved in the sport he is deemed to impliedly agree
to relieve the defendant of his duty to the plaintiff.29 In effect, the defend-
ant is granted an immunity from liability. This form of assumption of the
risk is most commonly encountered in the cases and is referred to as
implied assumption of the risk. The other form of assumption of the risk is
where the plaintiff is aware of and voluntarily encounters a risk created by
the existing negligence of the defendant.30 In both forms a subjective test is
used to determine whether the plaintiff knows and appreciates the risk, but
his testimony on this matter will not be conclusive.
3
'
The defense of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
often overlap. When plaintiff enters into a sporting event knowing the risks
involved and reasonably incurs them, he has impliedly assumed the risk but
is not contributorily negligent.3 2 When plaintiff enters into a sporting event
knowing the risks involved and unreasonably incurs them, he has impliedly
assumed the risk and is contributorily negligent.33
25. Richmond v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1974);
Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737, (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
26. Ninio v. Hight, 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1967).
27. Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 147 N.W.2d 587 (1966).
28. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965).
30. Id. at § 496A, Comment c.
31. Crane v. Kansas City Baseball Co., 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S.W. 1076 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1913).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, Comment c (1965).
33. Id. at Comment d. This area of overlap between the two defenses is often
overlooked by the courts. In Boynton v. Ryan, 257 F.2d 70 (3rd Cir. 1958) plaintiff-
golfer teed off, lost his ball in foliage, waived defendant through, and then entered
the foliage in search for his ball knowing another ball was to be hit which he would
not be able to see. The plaintiff was contributorily negligent since his conduct was
unreasonable. The utility of finding his ball at that moment was outweighed by the
risk of grave harm which could result. The court overlooked the defense of
assumption of the risk. Plaintiff voluntarily incurred a known risk.
In Turel v. Milberg, 10 Misc. 2d 141, 169 N.Y.S.2d 955 (App. Term 1957)
plaintiff was actually aware of defendant's negligence in hitting the golf ball without
shouting a warning. The plaintiff actually saw defendant swing the club and then
diverted his attention elsewhere. The court held that plaintiff had assumed the risk
but failed to recognize that contributory negligence was also involved. Once having
discovered defendant's negligence, plaintiff unreasonably encountered it.
Occasionally the courts recognize that both assumption of the risk and con-
tributory negligence are available as defenses. In Benedetto v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172
So. 2d 354 (La. App. 1965) the batter threw the bat and hit plaintiff who was sitting
along the third base line. The court recognized that the plaintiff was not only
contributorily negligent but assumed the risk as well.
[Vol. 42
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When assumption of the risk is raised as a defense to negligence, the
key issue is identifying the types of conduct a participant impliedly assumes
the risks of by the fact of his participation in the game. Some cases state that
participants assume the risk of negligent conduct which is forseeable, 4 or
that participants assume the risks that are inherent or ordinarily incident to
that sport.35 However, these cases merely establish labels which are used to
support the court's ultimate decision that the particular risk has or has not
been assumed by the plaintiff. No analysis is supplied to guide future
decisions. Thus, a case by case approach is necessary to determine what
risks are "forseeable" or are "inherent" or "ordinarily incident" to that
sport.
Some cases state a broad rule that a participant, by the fact of his
participation, assumes the natural and ordinary risks of the contest but
does not as a matter of law assume the risk of defendant's negligence.36 The
cases provide no justification for such an absolute rule. This rule is analo-
gous to the master-servant concept that a servant does not assume the risk
of his master's negligence. Thus, whenever proof of negligence on the part
of the master appears, the defense of assumption of the risk "falls out of
the case."
3 7
Some cases properly recognize that the risk of defendant's negligent
conduct can be assumed when the plaintiff voluntarily exposes himself to
defendant's existing negligent acts. In Turpin v. Shoemaker3 8 deceased and
defendant were engaged in a "quick draw" contest. Unfortunately, defend-
ant's revolver contained a live cartridge. The court stated that a plaintiff
may assume the risk of defendant's negligence which he knows of and
appreciates.3 9 The court held that deceased did not assume the risk because
he did not know that defendant's gun contained a live cartridge.40 In
Gregory v. Hester41 plaintiff's eye was injured when a bullet ricocheted from
a target at which plaintiff and defendant were shooting. The court stated
that where a participant knows a dangerous act is taking place and he
voluntarily engages in the activity, he assumes the risk even if the act
34. Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40, 42 (La. App. 1976); Brady v. Kane,
111 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. App. 1959).
35. Richmond v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 118, 122 (La. App.
1974); Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831, 834 (La. App.
1961); Schamel v. St. Louis Arena Corp., 324 S.W.2d 375, 378 (St. L. Mo. App.
1959).
36. Rosenberger v. Central Louisiana Dist. Livestock Show, Inc., 312 So. 2d
300, 304 (La. 1975); Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So. 2d 49,53 (La. App. 1956); Page v.
Unterreiner, 106 S.W.2d 528, (Spr. Mo. App. 1937); Toohey v. Webster, 97 N.J.L.
545, 117 A. 838 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922); Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 704, 706 (1949).
37. Terry v. Boss Hotels, Inc., 376 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1964).
38. 427 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1968).
39. Id. at 490.
40. Id. See also Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737,741 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1976).
41. 123 Ga. App. 406, 181 S.E.2d 104 (1971).
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constitutes negligence per se.42
When the risk of conduct is held not to be assumed by a participant,
the courts often talk in terms of reckless behavior not being assumed by a
participant or are dealing with behavior by the defendant which ap-
proaches recklessness. These courts do not say that the doctrine of assump-
tion of the risk is not a defense to recklessness, but rather, that reckless
behavior is not within the scope of conduct which is "forseeable," "inher-
ent," or "ordinarily incident" to that sport. Again, the courts are merely
attaching labels to conduct to support their ultimate decision that the
particular risk has or has not been assumed by the plaintiff. A case by case
approach is needed to determine what conduct falls into the category of
"reckless." In Moe v. Steenberg43 the court held that an ice skater assumed
the risk of falling down and having nearby skaters, who were skating
backwards, fall over her. However, the court stated that a participant does
not assume the risk of conduct which is so reckless or inept as to be
unanticipated.' In Bourque v. Duplechin45 the court held that plaintiff
second baseman did not assume the risk of defendant base runner going
five feet out of his way to run over plaintiff. The court stated that a
participant does not assume the risk of injury from players acting with
reckless disregard for others.4 6 Similarly, in Arnold v. Schmeiser4 7 plaintiff,
who was being thrown into the air by two defendants in a game of "fire-
man's chair," did not assume the risk that defendants would make no
attempt at all to catch him and simply walk away.
In Missouri, the viability of the defense of assumption of the risk in
negligence cases has been questioned.48 In Niemczyk v. Burleson49 defend-
ant shortstop positioned herself in the baseline so that plaintiff base runner
would collide with her. The plaintiff alleged negligence and the court held
that the petition stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Al-
though the court recognized that recent cases had characterized assump-
tion of the risk as "an extremely doubtful defense," 50 it concluded that the
doctrine had not yet expired in Missouri.
The third theory of recovery available to a participant injured in an
athletic event is recklessness. Recklessness requires an act or omission by
one knowing of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize his
42. Id. at 409, 181 S.E.2d at 107.
43. 275 Minn. 448, 14 N.W.2d 587 (1966).
44. Id. at 451, 147 N.W.2d at 589.
45. 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976).
46. Id. at 42. See also Douglas v. Converse, 248 Pa. 232, 93 A. 955 (1915).
47. 34 App. Div. 2d 568, 309 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1970).
48. Ballew v. Schlotzhauer, 492 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Mo. 1973). See also Terry v.
Boss Hotels, Inc., 376 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1964); Kungle v. Austin, 380 S.W.2d
354, 362 (Mo. 1964) (an instruction on assumption of the risk should only be given
in exceptional cases).
49. 538 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
50. Id. at 741. See McCormick v. Smith, 459 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Mo. 1970).
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conduct creates a high degree of risk to the safety of another.-" Unlike
negligence actions, plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a defense to
defendant's reckless conduct.5 2 However, the doctrine of assumption of the
risk is a defense to both negligent and reckless conduct.53
In Nabozny v. Barnhil54 the Illinois Court of Appeals held that a player
is liable for injury if his conduct was either deliberate, wilful, or reckless.
The court acknowledged that it was carefully narrowing the standard of
conduct in order to control this new field of personal injury litigation.5
The court also declared that three additional elements must exist before
this standard applies:(1) the teams must be trained and coached by knowl-
edgeable personnel; (2) there must be a recognized set of rules in force;
and (3) a safety rule must be contained therein which is primarily designed
to protect players from injury the violation of which must cause the injury.
The court disagreed with defendant's contention that he was immune from
tort action for an injury to another player during the course of a game.
The court also found plaintiff not contributorily negligent because suffi-
cient evidence existed for a jury to find that he exercised ordinary care.
The Illinois court has made recklessness an element of plaintiff-
participant's case. By adopting this approach, the court appeared to reject
the recent line of cases which allow plaintiff a cause of action for negli-
gence.56 By requiring recklessness in order for plaintiff to recover, the
Illinois court obtained the same result that other courts could reach by
using assumption of the risk analysis and following the cases that recognize
that in a sporting event the risk of defendant's negligence can be assumed
by the plaintiff in the proper circumstances5 7 but not the risk of defend-
ant's recklessness. 58 Thus, by analyzing tort cases in athletic events from the
basis of assumption of the risk a result is reached nearly identical to the
Illinois court's holding that recklessness is needed for recovery.
Analysis by assumption of the risk is a superior approach because it
does not establish a rigid rule that recklessness is needed for recovery. It is
more flexible because it properly focuses on what risks the plaintiff actually
was aware of, appreciated, and voluntarily incurred rather than automati-
cally requiring that defendant be reckless. However, in Illinois the defense
of assumption of the risk is probably not available except in master-servant
cases.59 Contributory negligence of the plaintiff was not available because
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
52. Id. § 503.
53. Id. § 496A, Comment d.
54. 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
55. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
56. Cases cited notes 23-27 supra.
57. Cases cited notes 38-42 supra.
58. Cases cited notes 43-47 supra.
59. The majority of Illinois cases hold that the defense of assumption of the
risk is not available except in master-servant cases. Maytneir v. Rush, 80 Ill: App. 2d
336, 225 N.E.2d 83 (1967). A minority of cases allow the defense in other situations.
Hargis v. Standard Oil Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 119, 134 N.E.2d 518 (1956). Only one
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reasonable care was exercised by the plaintiff. Thus, the only remaining
alternative which would restrict recovery for athletic injuries was to make
recklessness an element of plaintiff's case.
In requiring reckless conduct by defendant before plaintiff can re-
cover for injuries suffered in an athletic event, the Illinois court is fostering
free and vigorous participation in sports. The court is correct in following
this policy because the law should not place unreasonable burdens on
participation in sporting events. Fear of civil litigation arising from injuries
suffered in an athletic event could severely limit the fervor with which the
game should be played as well as deter individuals from participating. Yet,
of course, some civil controls are necessary to protect players from injury.
Several approaches are available to the courts in jurisdictions other than
Illinois. First, they could follow the Illinois approach and restrict recovery
in tort by requiring recklessness as an element of plaintiff's cause of action.
Contributory negligence would not be a defense and the various forms of
assumption of the risk may be a defense if recognized in the jurisdiction.
Second, they could allow plaintiff to state a cause of action for negligence.
Contributory negligence would be a defense but often would not bar
recovery because plaintiff's participation in the sport is usually reasonable.
If assumption of the risk is available as a defense, the courts could follow
the cases which hold the plaintiff does not as a matter of law impliedly
assume the risk of defendant's negligence.6" Under this view recovery by
plaintiff would be readily available in negligence actions. The courts could
follow the cases which recognize that a plaintiff may assume the risk of
defendant's negligence, if he knows the dangerous act is taking place and
he voluntarily exposes himself to the risk."' Under this latter view rec6very
by the plaintiff could be denied in negligence actions. To foster unfettered
participation in sports, plaintiff should be allowed to state a cause of action
for negligence but his recovery should be limited by recognizing that the
risk of defendant's negligence can be assumed when the player knows the
dangerous act is taking place and he voluntarily exposes himself to the risk.
If assumption of the risk is not recognized as a defense in the jurisdiction,
plaintiff should only be allowed to recover if the defendant was reckless.
DANIEL K. BARKLAGE
case has argued for the doctrine's general applicability. Campion v. Chicago Land-
scape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N.E.2d 879 (1938) (a golfer assumed the risk of
being struck by a ball of another player).
60. Cases cited note 36 supra.
61. Cases cited notes 38-42 supra.
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